This paper explores a hitherto overlooked consequence of regime change in Africa. It shows how the shift from one-party to multiparty rule in the region altered the kinds of ethnic cleavages that structure political competition and conflict. The paper demonstrates how the different strategic logics of political competition in one-party and multiparty settings create incentives for political actors to emphasize different kinds of ethnic identities: local-level identities (usually revolving around tribe or clan) in one-party elections, and broader-scale identities (usually revolving around region, language, or religion) in multiparty elections. The argument is illustrated with evidence from the 1991 and 1992 regime transitions in Zambia and Kenya.
Since 1989, roughly twenty African nations have undergone transitions from oneparty to multiparty rule.
1 This paper explores the effects of this (re-)introduction of competitive multiparty elections on ethnic conflict. In doing so, however, the paper examines an overlooked consequence of regime change. Rather than ask whether the shift to multiparty competition led to a change in the intensity of inter-group violence (e.g., Glickman 1995; Ottaway 1998; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Smith 2000; Human Rights Watch 2001; Chua 2003) , I focus instead on how the transition from one-party to multiparty rule altered the dimension of ethnic cleavage around which political competition -violent or otherwise -takes place. The dependent variable I treat is not the level of conflict but its locus. I explore not whether the shift to multiparty rule has caused more ethnic conflict to occur but whether it has caused ethnic conflict to be carried out in the name of different kinds of identities. I present evidence from the regime changes in Zambia and Kenya in 1991 and 1992 to show that it has.
The starting point for my analysis is the observation that African political systems possess multiple lines of potentially mobilizable ethnic cleavage. Although ordinarily lumped under the umbrella term "ethnic," communal identities in Africa take many forms. Sometimes people identify themselves in religious terms. At other times they distinguish themselves from others by language. At still other times in-group/out-group distinctions are made on the basis of tribal affiliation, clan membership, geographic region of origin, or race. 2 Within a single country, each of these distinctions may serve, in different situations, as potential axes of social differentiation and conflict. Describing the situation in Ghana, for example, Naomi Chazan (1982: 467-68) A vast literature documents the context-dependence of ethnic identities (e.g., Mitchell 1956; Young 1976; Horowitz 1985; Chandra 2004 ). Usually, "context" is determined by factors that are fleeting and individualized: who the person happens to be interacting with at the moment; the events or issues of the day; the person's physical location at the time they are reflecting on who they are. In this paper, I show that the one-party or multiparty nature of the political system also defines a context that affects the kinds of ethnic identities that people use to define themselves. Political competition in a one-party setting, I demonstrate, generates incentives for individuals to identify themselves in terms of ethnic identities that define them as members of small, localized groups of people. In an African context, this usually means identities based on tribe, subtribe, or clan. Political competition in multiparty settings, by contrast, creates incentives
Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner for individuals to see themselves in terms of ethnic identities that define them as members of large blocks -usually based on religious, linguistic, or regional distinctions.
The transition from one-party to multiparty political competition therefore alters the identities that people embrace and, through this, the ethnic cleavages that come to matter in politics. The salience of ethnicity per se may not change -in fact, the argument presented in this paper depends on the assumption that the desirability of supporting a member of one's own ethnic group is equally strong in both one-party and multiparty systems -but the salience of the particular dimension of ethnic cleavage that defines the political conflict can be transformed by the shift in regime type.
The first part of the paper elaborates the argument for why one-party and multiparty elections cause different ethnic cleavages to come to the fore. The second and third parts draw on evidence from the 1991 and 1992 regime transitions in Zambia and Kenya to illustrate the effects of regime type on the salience of alternative ethnic cleavages. The final section draws out the broader implications of the argument.
HOW REGIME CHANGE AFFECTS THE ETHNIC CLEAVAGES THAT MATTER IN POLITICS
The explanation for why regime type matters for the kinds of ethnic cleavages that become politically salient rests on two claims about the nature of African politics.
The first is that African voters seek to maximize the amount of resources they can secure from the state. The resources in question include benefits such as jobs, development funds, agricultural subsidies, feeder roads, health clinics, relief food, and schools. The game of politics is understood to revolve around the transfer of these scarce but highly desired benefits by politicians in return for voters ' political support (e.g., Ekeh 1975;  Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Young and Turner 1985; Chabal and Daloz 1999; van de Walle 2001; Lindberg 2003; Wantchekon 2003) . Young and Turner summarize this clientelistic or (neo-) patrimonial system well in their description of the politics of (what, at the time they were writing, was then) Zaire:
In the richly evocative Nigerian phrase, politics was 'cutting the national cake.' The output of the state was perceived as divisible into slices of possibly unequal size, sweet to the taste, and intended to be eaten. A 'they' category, in control of political institutions, would exploit its power to impose its dominion upon 'we,' and to reserve for itself the lion's share of state resources " (1985: 147) .
What Young and Turner do not say -at any rate, not in this passage -is that, in the African context, "we" and "they" are frequently seen in ethnic terms. This is because, in many countries, voters assume that the likelihood that resources will be channeled to them -the likelihood that they will get to "eat" -is directly related to whether or not the politician who controls those resources is from their ethnic group (Barkan 1979; Kanyinga 1994; Posner 2005 ). In such a setting, the competition for jobs, development resources, and other benefits becomes a struggle among ethnic communities to put one of their own into a position of political power. This is the second key claim about the nature of African politics: voters seek access to state resources by allocating their electoral support to members of their own ethnic groups, who they assume will be more likely than or the fellow Ibadan resident, who may be a Christian? If the goal is to put someone from her own group in power, then any of these candidates would be preferable to a candidate who shared neither her religious nor her linguistic nor her geographic background. But given at least some shared group membership with all three -language group in the first; home town in the second; religion in the third -which would be best in terms of maximizing the resources that are likely to flow to her? For which candidate should she cast her vote?
The answer is that if her objective is to maximize her access to resources, she will do best by supporting the candidate who puts her in the winning coalition. Throwing her support behind a candidate from her own group will not do her any good if that candidate does not win, so a first criterion is whether the group is large enough relative to other groups to win. 4 So long as everyone else is also voting exclusively along group lines, this Thus, if the cleavage is "religion," she will need to compare the size of her own religious group (say, Muslims) with the sizes of all the other religious groups (say, Christians and Hindus) in the political arena. Then, she should select the principle of group division that puts her in the most advantageous group vis-a-vis the other groups, and throw her support behind the candidate from that group.
Of course, in many cases, voters will lack the exact demographic information necessary to parse the relative sizes of all the groups on each cleavage dimension. This will be particularly the case when the groups the voter is comparing are close in size.
Also, in some instances personal relationships with particular candidates, independent knowledge about a candidate's ability to extract resources from the state, or the receipt of (Collier 1982) . These seemingly minor differences turn out to have important effects.
In one-party systems, where the outcome of the presidential election is determined in advance, the only electoral contest of consequence is the one over who will represent each parliamentary constituency. The parliamentary election thus becomes the central locus of competition in the political system. This has the effect of shrinking the effective arena of political conflict from the nation as a whole to the level of the local electoral constituency. In multiparty elections, by contrast, when control over the executive is at issue, electoral competition takes place at two levels simultaneously: at the national level (for the presidency) and at the constituency level (for parliamentary representation). In practice, however, the effective arena of political competition for both the presidential and parliamentary contests is the national arena. This is because party labels transform parliamentary candidates into representatives of national coalitions -parties, after all, are competing for national power -and this shifts the frame of reference in the constituencylevel contest from the local to the national level. Party labels do not play this role in oneparty parliamentary elections because they do not vary across candidates: in a singleparty system, all candidates must, by law, run on the ticket of the single ruling party.
Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner Why, then, are candidates in multiparty elections seen in terms of their party affiliations rather than in terms of their personal attributes and reputation? Ordinarily, the relative importance that voters attach to these two sources of information will depend on the particular characteristics of the electoral system, including the degree of control that party leaders exercise over access to the party label, whether or not votes are pooled across parties, whether voters cast one vote or many, and the magnitude of electoral districts (Carey and Shugart 1995) . But in the highly centralized presidential systems that predominate in Africa ( cleavages that define national-scale groups when the arena of political competition expands to the entire country under multiparty rule. In most African countries, this means that one-party elections revolve around tribal, sub-tribal, or clan differences (since these tend to divide electoral constituencies), whereas multiparty elections revolve
Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner around regional, linguistic, or in some cases religious cleavages (since these tend to be national in scope). In both settings, politicians seek to build minimum winning coalitions, and voters cast their votes so as to secure membership in them. And in both settings, politicians and voters alike use ethnicity as an instrument to achieve these ends.
But because the arenas of competition are different, the ethnic communities out of which these coalitions are crafted are different as well.
The precise kinds of cleavages that emerge as salient in one-party and multiparty settings vary from country to country. At the constituency-level, they also vary from region to region within countries. For example, urban areas, with populations drawn from different regions, tend to give rise to different salient cleavages (often regionallybased) than homogeneous rural areas (usually tribal or clan-based). 8 Thus while the common prediction in all cases is that local-level cleavages will structure political conflict in one-party elections while national-level cleavages will do so in multiparty contests, the specific kinds of local-and national-scale cleavages that play these roles will differ from case to case.
In addition, not all electoral systems are equally sensitive to changes in regime type. Single-member plurality (SMP) systems, in which individual candidate characteristics are particularly salient in one-party races and where party labels are especially important in multiparty races (Carey and Shugart 1995) , are the institutional setting in which the effect should be strongest. 9 The cases of Zambia and Kenya -both former British colonies with SMP systems and a recent history of transition from competitive single-party to multiparty elections -are thus particularly well suited for testing the predictions of the argument advanced in this paper. For both countries, I first 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988 -before a groundswell of political pressure forced the government to reintroduce multiparty politics in 1991 (Bratton 1994) . Since that date, Zambia has held three multiparty contests -in 1991, 1996, and 2001. All of these elections, both one-party and multiparty, featured multiple candidates competing for parliamentary seats in competitive races. The only significant differences among them was whether or not the candidates were running on the ticket of the same party (which they were in the one-party contests but were not in the multiparty contests) and whether the president faced challengers (which he did in the multiparty elections but did not in the one-party elections). Systematic evidence for this shift can be found by comparing voting patterns before and after the 1991 regime transition. If the salient cleavage dimension shifted in the way the argument advanced in this paper would lead us to expect, then we should find the share of votes cast for candidates from a particular tribe in the pre-transition (oneparty) elections be roughly equal to the share of voters in the constituency that are members of that tribe but, in the post-transition (multiparty) elections, the match between the tribal demographics of the constituency and the candidates' vote shares should be less good. 11 A better predictor of electoral success in multiparty contests should be the match between the presumed language-group orientation of the party with which the candidate is affiliated and the language group of the bulk of the population in the constituency.
To test these predictions, I collected information on the tribal backgrounds of every one of the more than 1,700 parliamentary candidates that ran for rural seats in the Zambian national assembly in the two elections that preceded the shift to multiparty rule (1983 and 1988 ) and the two elections that followed (1991 and 1996) . 12 I also used data from Zambia's 1990 census to calculate the tribal demographics of each of these electoral
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I first test the argument by comparing the degree of tribal voting in the one-party contests (1983 and 1988 ) and the two multiparty contests (1991 and 1996) . I do this by comparing share of the dominant tribe in each constituency with the share of the vote won by parliamentary candidates belonging to that tribe -tribal voting being indicated by a correlation between the two. 14 Note that focusing only on the behavior of dominant tribe voters addresses only one implication of the argument: we would also expect members of the second most numerous tribe to vote for candidates from their group, members of the third most numerous tribe to vote for candidates from their group, and so on. But restricting the analysis to the behavior of members of the dominant tribe in each constituency greatly simplifies the analysis.
While the argument leads us to expect to find greater tribal voting in one-party than multiparty elections, the expectation is not that we will find no evidence of tribal voting in multiparty contests. In multiparty elections, candidates that are supported because of their party affiliations but who happen to be members of the dominant tribe will look, in the data, like they were supported because of their tribal background. The bias will therefore be toward over-estimating the degree of tribal voting in multiparty elections. Since this will make it more difficult to find a difference in the degree of tribal voting in one-party and multiparty settings, any difference I do find can be interpreted as fairly strong support for the predictions of the argument. 
FIGURE 1 HERE
If the argument is right, we would expect the points in the one-party election scatterplot to be bunched closely about the y=x line and the points in the multiparty election scatterplot to be distributed more broadly. This is what we find. Yet, the points in even the one-party scatterplot do not lie right along the y=x line. This suggests that factors other than the candidates' tribal backgrounds motivated voters' choices. For our purposes, however, the "tightness of fit" of the scatter around the y=x reference line is less important than the difference in that fit across the two panels, which does seem to be better appreciably better in the one-party elections than in the multiparty ones. Indeed, the correlation between the dominant tribe's population share and its vote share is 0.67 for the one-party cases and 0.17 for the multiparty cases.
What about language group voting? Since language group voting is mediated by candidates' party labels, and since party labels only vary across candidates in multiparty races, it is not possible directly to compare patterns of language group voting in one-party and multiparty elections. It is, however, possible to investigate whether voters in whether or not the party on whose ticket the candidate was running in the multiparty contest was affiliated with the dominant language group in the constituency. To do this, I
asked whether the president of the party on whose ticket the candidate was running was a member of the language group that dominated the constituency. If the answer was yes, then the candidate was coded as running on the ticket of the "right" party. 16 If the argument advanced in this paper is right, we should expect this variable to be a powerful predictor of a candidate's electoral performance.
An example will make the exercise more concrete. Consider a pair of otherwise identical candidates running for a seat in Bemba-speaking Northern Province in 1991:
one running on the ticket of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD); the other on the ticket of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). If party labels convey information about language group orientations as I have suggested, then we would expect the candidate running on the MMD ticket to win a larger share of the vote, since the MMD is closely associated in voters' minds with Northern Province Bemba-speakers (its president at the time, Fredrick Chiluba, being a Bemba-speaker). However, had the same candidates been running for a seat in Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province, we would have The results of the analysis bear out these expectations. The first column in Table   1 presents a simple regression of candidates' vote share in 1991 on a dummy variable indicating whether or not the candidate was running on the ticket of the "right" party, as I have defined it above. The relationship is very strong, both statistically and substantively. The interpretation of the coefficient estimate is that a candidate running on the ticket of the "right" party would expect to win a vote share fully 50 percentage points higher than a candidate running on the ticket of the "wrong" party.
TABLE 1 HERE
Those familiar with Zambia's political transition election might object that the 1991 election was less an occasion for voters to parse the differences among candidates than a referendum on change. Indeed, as the vanguard party of change, the MMD won the support of fully 75 percent of voters. Yet even controlling for whether or not a candidate was running on the MMD ticket, as I do in column 2, the strong relationship between a candidate's vote share and whether or not he or she was running the ticket of a party associated with the dominant language group is sustained. A candidate running on the ticket of the "right" party is now estimated to have a 45 percentage point advantage over his opponent.
In column 3, I control for a number of other determinants of electoral success, including the number of candidates in the race (which has the expected negative sign), the candidate's vote share in the previous election (which has the expected positive sign), including all the controls from column 3 but omitting the "right party" variable, the "right tribe"
variable becomes substantively and statistically significant (at p > .05), with a coefficient of .149.
Taken together, the findings suggest that the one-party or multiparty nature of the political system does indeed affect patterns of ethnic voting in the ways the argument developed in the paper would lead us to expect.
REGIME CHANGE AND ETHNIC CLEAVAGES IN KENYA
Kenya, like Zambia, is a place where ethnicity matters. It is a place where people view their political representatives as sources of patronage (Barkan 1979; Widner 1992) and where they assume that having a member of their ethnic group in a position of political power will increase their access to state resources (Hyden and Leys 1972; Haugerud 1995) . Writing about a visit to the country in 1993, Haugerud notes that "many Kenyans I talked with in both town and countryside…discussed the nation's political future in explicit ethnic and regional terms, and assumed that the ethnic identity of a new president would define patterns of favoritism" (42). However, Kenya, like Zambia, is also a place where people understand their "ethnic group" in multiple ways. Unlike Zambia, where the relevant axes of ethnic cleavage at the local and national levels are uniform (tribe in the former; language in the latter), the principles of group identification that Kenyans use to categorize themselves at the local and national levels tend to vary from one part of the country to another. For the Mijikenda, whose national-level self-identification is regional or even religious -they are the (predominantly Muslim) people of the coast -local level distinctions are made in terms of tribal affiliations. For the Luo, the national-level principle of ethnic identification is tribal (which works for them because they are a fairly large tribal group), while locallevel distinctions are based on clan affiliations. For the Kalenjin, local-level distinctions are tribal, but the cultural glue that holds the group together when it competes on the national stage is language (and, to a lesser degree, pastoralism). 19 Yet irrespective of the different principles of group membership that each community employs at each level, the important point is that Kenyans have clearly distinct local and national-scale ethnic identities. This makes it possible to inquire whether, as in Zambia, the shift from oneparty to multiparty rule in 1992 caused political actors to alter the way they viewed their ethnic group memberships: from local-level social divisions during the first period to national-level cleavages during the second.
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Kenya held competitive single-party elections in 1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, and 1988. 20 As in Zambia, the only significant institutional difference between these elections and the multiparty ones that have followed was whether or not candidates were running on the ticket of the same party and whether the president faced challengers.
Accounts of Kenya's one-party contests suggest that electoral competition revolved centrally around locally-defined ethnic communities. Rival candidates in one-party With the shift to multiparty competition in 1992, however, the relevant lines of ethnic cleavage changed. Whereas local cleavages had been central in the one-party context, the transition to multiparty rule brought a shift to regional patterns of ethnic voting and alliance-building. 21 With the shift to multiparty competition, the politicians' local ethnic backgrounds were trumped by the regional ethnic orientations suggested by their party affiliations. Throup and Hornsby describe the change:
In previous elections, in the one-party state, the main electoral factors had been clanism and localism…Many observers and candidates expected that the 1992 general election would be fought on the same basis…This was not to be…In the end… regional and ethnic [sic] blocs were to prove the key to the outcome (1998: 339).
The return to multiparty competition did nothing to change Kenyans' assumptions about whether or not patronage distribution would follow ethnic lines: they continued to assume that it would. Nor did it alter their beliefs that they needed to support candidates from their own groups. But it completely changed the criteria they used to determine which candidates were, or were not, fellow group members. Whereas local identities had defined group membership and served as axes of electoral competition in the one-party era, national-level identities and cleavages assumed these roles in the new multiparty setting. As Throup and Honsby (1998: 589) summarize: "neo-patrimonialism shifted from the micro-to the macro-level."
This shift in the relevant basis of political competition was reflected in the extremely high geographic concentration of the vote in the 1992 election (and also the one that followed in 1997). Whereas one-party elections had tended to be fairly close Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner contests, a large number of the 1992 (and 1997) races were won in landslides. Indeed, so strongly did parties draw on their regional bases in these contests that Barkan and Ng'ethe (1998) As in the Zambia analysis, an example will help clarify the exercise. Suppose that two candidates were running in Kiambu district in 1992, one on a FORD-Asili ticket, the To test for the impact of party labels more systematically, I proceeded exactly as I did in the Zambia analysis described above. First I identified all parliamentary candidates that had run in the same constituencies against at least one other candidate in both the 1988 one-party election and the 1992 multiparty election. Then I created a "right party" variable by coding whether or not the party on whose ticket the candidate was running in 1992 was affiliated with the dominant ethno-regional group in the constituency. 22 Table 2 presents the results of the analysis. As in the Zambia analysis, I begin in column 1 with a simple regression of candidates' vote share in 1992 on a dummy variable indicating whether or not the candidate was running on the ticket of the "right" party. The relationship is extremely strong, statistically and substantively. The interpretation of the coefficient is that a candidate running on the ticket of the "right" party for that particular constituency would expect to outperform his rivals by 45 percentage points.
In column 2, I add a variable to control for whether or not the candidate was running on the KANU ticket. In the Zambia analysis, controlling for whether or not the candidate was running on the MMD ticket was necessary because the MMD label identified candidates as agents of political change -something that almost all voters in Zambia supported in 1991. The KANU label had no such association in with political change Kenya in 1992; indeed, the opposite was probably true. I include it, instead, to control for the possibility that KANU candidates were advantaged by their ability to draw on state resources in the campaign. 23 The small, insignificant (and negative) coefficient on the KANU variable suggests that this channel of influence on electoral support, while plausible, was much less important than running on the ticket of the party associated with the dominant ethnic group in the area. The inclusion of additional controls in column 3
(for whether or not the candidate was an incumbent, the number of candidates running in the contest, the candidate's vote share in the prior election, the number of candidates in that election, and interactions between the number of candidates in 1992 and 1988 and the candidate's prior vote share) does little to alter the core finding: that running on the ticket of the party that voters identify with the interests of their broad ethno-regional group was the most powerful predictor of a candidate's success. This is exactly what we Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner would expect to find if voters allocated their electoral support in the way the argument developed in this paper predicts they should.
CONCLUSION
The wave of political liberalization that swept across Africa in the early 1990s
was accompanied by a wave of scholarship on its effects. 24 A number of authors speculated on the impact that the shift from one-party to multiparty rule would have on ethnic conflict in the region. Some argued that the introduction of competitive multiparty elections would set ethnic groups against each other and cause communal strife to intensify. Others suggested that the civil liberties and protections commonly provided by liberal regimes would cause ethnic conflicts to diminish. Whatever the anticipated outcome, however, the focus of attention was on the effect that regime change would have on the intensity of the conflict between ethnic communities. No attention was paid to the possibility that the (re-)introduction of competitive multiparty elections might have an effect on the kinds of groups in whose name the conflict was being carried out.
The goal of this paper has been to show that, quite apart from the effect that regime change may have had on the intensity of ethnic conflict (a worthy topic that I do not treat here), it also had a critical (and heretofore overlooked) impact on the kinds of ethnic cleavages around which that conflict was structured. This paper illustrates the point with data from Zambia and Kenya. In the pre-transition eras in these countries, defined party, they put voters of the other group who do choose among parties at a collective disadvantage. All else being equal, such voters will seek to reduce their disadvantage by concentrating their votes in a comparable ethnic party. In such a situation, ethnic voters tend to drive out non-ethnic votes" (323).
6 One-party and multiparty regimes often differ on other dimensions as well -for example in the freedom they provide for civil society groups and the press, the opportunities they offer for incumbent legislators to be displaced by challengers, and the degree of governmental control they require over campaigning practices and electoral appeals. However, it would be difficult to link variation of these sorts to variation in the kinds of ethnic cleavages that emerge as salient in one-party and multiparty settings.
7 Bates (1989) and Gibson (1999) offer slightly different arguments that generate the same expectation about the national-or constituency-level locus of political competition in one-party and multiparty systems.
8 See, for example, Mitchell (1956) and Young (1976) .
9 Although Carey and Shugart's analysis only deals with multiparty systems, one of the systems they discuss (SNTV with open endorsements and district magnitude = 1) exactly captures the one-party single-member plurality system described in this paper. This is the system in which, according to their typology, candidates' personal reputations are most important.
10 Urban constituencies should reflect a different pattern. High rates of in-migration to Zambia's urban areas during the colonial era transformed urban districts into microcosms of the country as a whole. Thus the structure of national-and constituency-level cleavages in urban areas of Zambia are nearly identical, and we would expect the shift Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa Daniel N. Posner 36 from one-party to multiparty rule to generate no change in the kinds of identities that emerge as salient. Since 80 percent of Zambia's electoral constituencies are located in rural areas, the rural outcome can reasonably be taken to be the outcome writ large.
Nonetheless, in the analyses that follow, I limit my treatment to rural constituencies only.
11 Of course, such an analysis is only possible if constituencies are ethnically heterogeneous, which they are in Zambia (but, unfortunately, are not in Kenya). 14 There are well known dangers in making inferences about individual-level behavior (such as voting decisions) from aggregate data (e.g., King 1997) . But so long as there is no reason to believe that the potential bias from the ecological inference problem is greater in one-party than multiparty elections, this should not present a major difficulty for the analysis I am undertaking here.
